Context: In the summer of 2026, an abnormal heat wave swept across Europe. On August 14, Bloomberg reported that the heat wave could eliminate nearly all of the European Union’s projected GDP growth, costing EU economies approximately €180 billion. The drought and heat sparked deadly wildfires that have already burned more than 490,000 hectares — nearly 2.5 times the average for the same period over the past 20 years. The Rhine, one of Europe’s main transportation arteries, is experiencing low water levels. More than 25,000 people have died, and many regions have seen almost no rain since June.
On August 10, 2026, TASS published a column by Anatoly Tikhonov, the head of the Center for International Agribusiness and Food Security at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). He claimed that sanctions against Russia are hurting the European Union because extreme heat has allegedly left the bloc unable to feed itself.
“The climate pendulum has swung so far that there is no room for ‘what ifs’: old Europe can no longer feed itself. This is not an emotional metaphor, but rather, the harsh arithmetic of food balances. Grain, oil, wine, and sugar — the four pillars of European agricultural exports — have turned into disaster zones,” wrote Tikhonov.
He predicts that the European Union will have to import wheat, and that exports of oil, wine, and sugar will decline. The author argues that this will lead to rising prices and expose the weakness of the EU’s entire food system.
“The European heat wave of 2026 was not so much a weather phenomenon as it was a systemic stress test for the food architecture built by Western elites to serve their own needs. They are failing this test,” the column states.
However, the claim that the European Union is facing a food crisis is not supported by the available statistics. Let’s start with sugar. According to the European Commission, the EU has historically been a net importer of sugar, meaning it purchases more sugar from other countries than it sells. This is not a recent development from 2026, nor is it a result of the ongoing heat wave — this scenario has been observed previously.
The argument about olive oil is exaggerated. It can hardly be considered one of the four pillars of European agricultural exports. The total export revenue of the EU’s agri-food sector exceeds €200 billion. In 2025, the EU earned €6 billion from exports of olives and olive oil, accounting for 2.5% of its total agri-food exports outside the Union.
Wheat and wine are the products listed in the column that qualify as major EU exports. However, even in their case, the figures do not point to a food supply collapse. According to the TASS author, the European Union risks losing its status as a wheat exporter:
“The FAO’s June forecast projected the EU wheat harvest at 136.2 million metric tons. However, the July heat wave dashed those expectations. The August consensus among industry experts is that the wheat harvest will be well below the 120-million-ton psychological threshold.”
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) did not change this estimate in its latest forecast. The EU is expected to harvest just over 136 million tons of wheat. The European Commission’s forecast is lower, at about 125 million metric tons. However, this is not a disaster, as it is similar to the levels seen in 2022–2023. It is also higher than in 2020 and 2024. Despite the poor harvests during those years, there was no famine in the European Union.
The column continues by stating:
“Just yesterday, the EU had a comfortable export surplus. Now, however, it has come very close to the threshold beyond which it would need to rely on imports.”
In fact, the EU has always purchased some of its wheat abroad, regardless of the harvest. This typically amounts to 2–6 million tons per year. In years of poor harvests, such as the 2022/23 season, it reached nearly 10 million tons. However, since 2012, the EU has consistently sold many times more of its own wheat than it has purchased, at a rate of 25–30 million tons annually. This was true even during drought-stricken seasons. Therefore, even the most pessimistic forecasts for this year’s harvest do not indicate a collapse of EU food security. Over the years, the EU’s self-sufficiency rate for soft wheat has remained above 100%. In other words, the EU produced more than it consumed.
Another important detail is that Russia was not the EU’s primary source of grain. In 2021, it accounted for 5.8% of the EU’s grain imports. Meanwhile, Ukraine accounted for 37.1%.
The situation with wine is indeed more complicated. Last year was one of the worst years for winemakers in recent decades, and the heat this summer does not bode well for a quick recovery. However, difficulties with the harvest do not mean that exports have collapsed. Regardless of harvest yields, about 20% of the wine produced is consistently exported outside the EU. About 15 years ago, the export share was even lower. In 2011–2012, exports accounted for approximately 15% of production. In 2007, the figure was less than 10%.
The bottom line is this: the EU has experienced even weaker wheat harvests in the past, yet self-sufficiency has never fallen below 100%. Although there are wine production challenges, the statistics do not indicate a sustained collapse in exports. The European Union has long purchased sugar from abroad. Olive oil cannot be considered a mainstay of European agricultural exports. Extreme heat in Europe has indeed had a serious climate and economic impact. However, the idea that the European Union is no longer capable of feeding itself and will have to buy food from other countries because of the heat is greatly exaggerated. The statistics do not confirm a collapse of the EU’s food system or dependence on Russian grain.
